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RELIGION, FAMILY LAW, AND RECOGNITION OF
IDENTITY IN NIGERIA
M. Christian Green∗
INTRODUCTION
In March 2008, the journalist Eliza Griswold described a burgeoning
“competition” for believers between Muslims and Christians in the country of
Nigeria—“God’s Country” according to the article’s title.1 The description is
tragically ironic in light of the carnage that has accompanied this competition
in the form of waves of interreligious violence after the implementation of
Sharia criminal law in Nigeria’s northern states in 1999. The strife has resulted
in the deaths of an estimated 13,000 Nigerians.2 The Nigerian struggles over
Sharia, while not yet reaching the genocidal level of Rwanda, Congo, or
Sudan, seem especially emblematic of the way in which religion—often in
concert with other social, political, and economic factors—is manifesting itself
in sub-Saharan Africa today. The stakes in Nigeria are particularly high for
both U.S. and international relations. As Griswold points out:
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, with 140 million people
(one-seventh of all Africans), and it’s one of the few nations divided
almost evenly between Christians and Muslims. Blessed with the
world’s 10th-largest oil reserves, it is also one of the continent’s
richest and most influential powers—as well as one of its most
corrupt democracies. . . . The state has all but abdicated its
responsibility for the welfare of its people . . . . In this vacuum,
3
religion has become a powerful source of identity.

Such quests for identity have become a hallmark of modernity and
postmodernity, manifesting themselves in a variety of “politics of recognition”

∗ Senior Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Emory University School of Law.
The author would like to express her thanks to colleagues at the Religion and World Affairs Working Group at
the Social Science Research Council and at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University
of Notre Dame for their questions, feedback, and collegiality at multiple points in the production of this Essay.
1 Eliza Griswold, God’s Country, ATLANTIC, Mar. 2008, at 40, 41, 49.
2 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 98 (2011).
3 Griswold, supra note 1, at 42. Griswold observes that this competition is taking place both between
and within Islam and Christianity. Id. For a longer discussion of Nigeria, see generally ELIZA GRISWOLD, THE
TENTH PARALLEL: DISPATCHES FROM THE FAULT LINE BETWEEN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM (2010).
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over religious, ethnic, national, linguistic, cultural, sexual, and other markers
of individual and group identity.4 The concern for identity and recognition of
particular identities has even made it into human rights discourse and the
perennial debates over universal human rights and various forms of cultural or
other relativism, particularly around matters of religion.5
In discussions of religion and human rights—particularly the question of
whether there are special and distinctive “religious human rights”—religion
sometimes assumes a rather static and monolithic character. While not,
perhaps, as foundational to identity as the “Blood and Soil” categories of race
or national origin, religion has come to be seen, in the eyes of many religious
believers around the world, as nearly as fundamental as these categories when
it comes to individual and communal identity. Consultants at a recent
conference on “Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Africa”—convened in
Durban, South Africa by Emory University’s Center for the Study of Law and
Religion (“CSLR”)—emphasized both the importance of religion as a source
of identity competition and the interrelation of religion with various other
social, political, and economic concerns in much of sub-Saharan Africa.6 And
yet many who study conflict around the world, particularly in the social and
political sciences, have tended to view it mostly in terms of these social,
political, and particularly economic concerns—with religion being only
marginal or epiphenomenal. In this economic view, in particular, “Stuff”
trumps “Spirit,” and religion is seen as merely a “proxy” for other social,
political, and economic conflicts over mostly material resources.7
4 See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM AND “THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION” 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1992).
5
Some recent examples of this are the debate over “defamation of religions” at the United Nations
(“UN”) and the way in which religion became intertwined with race at the UN “World Conference Against
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance” held in Durban, South Africa, from
August 31 through September 8, 2001, and the follow-up “Durban Review Conference” held in Geneva,
Switzerland, from April 20 through 24, 2009.
6
For views emerging from that conference, see Symposium, The Foundations and Future of Law,
Religion, and Human Rights in Africa, 8 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 337, 337–595 (2008) [hereinafter Foundations
and Future of Law].
7
An important recent critique of this materialist and “areligious” view of conflict is offered in MONICA
DUFFY TOFT, DANIEL PHILPOTT & TIMOTHY SAMUEL SHAH, GOD’S CENTURY: RESURGENT RELIGION AND
GLOBAL POLITICS (2011). The arguments of Toft, Philpott, and Shah provide a political science account that
accords with the influential recent journalistic account of these themes in JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN
WOOLDRIDGE, GOD IS BACK: HOW THE GLOBAL REVIVAL OF FAITH IS CHANGING THE WORLD (2009). In their
study Toft, Philpott, and Shah emphasize the empirical data that show conflicts that are religious in nature tend
to be more violent. See TOFT, PHILPOTT & SHAH, supra, at 147–55. For an excellent philosophical discussion
of this phenomenon, see generally AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY
(2006).
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In Nigeria, religion and family are two central factors in both the current
conflict and the construction of individual and communal identity. Thus, the
potential effects of Sharia and other religious jurisprudence in the area of
family law represent, in the eyes of some, a threat to national democracy and to
individual and communal identity. The current conflict also has precedents
in—and bears the weight of—colonial history. As a former British colony,
subject to British policies that permitted colonized peoples to retain their laws
of personal status, Nigeria is a place, along with other former outposts of the
British Empire, where family and the laws that govern it matter considerably,
particularly when those laws are informed by religion.8
Recently, former American Ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell has
made some striking observations about the role of religious and family
identities in Nigerian conflicts. In a recent conference, he cited recent polling
in which 92% of Nigerian Muslims and 87% of Nigerian Christians “claimed
to identify themselves most strongly with their religion, then with their
family/ethnic group, and lastly with their country.”9 In his recent book,
Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink,10 Campbell further argues that one result of the
weakness of the Nigerian state has been that Nigerians have tended “to migrate
internally into the worlds of family, ethnic group, and religion,” such that now
“[f]amily, ethnic, and religious identities are trumping a sense of national
allegiance in large part because the state no longer addresses the basic
concerns and needs of the people.”11 Other recent polling confirms the
significance of religion, family, and identity in Nigeria, not only for
individuals and communities, but also for the Nigerian state.
In this Essay, I discuss some of the key features of Muslim-Christian
contestation in Nigeria as revealed in a recent survey conducted by the Pew
Forum on Religious Life, titled Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity
in Sub-Saharan Africa.12 I then discuss some of the Pew statistics that bear on

8
For an important discussion of these colonial themes, see MUSLIM FAMILY LAW IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA: COLONIAL LEGACIES AND POST-COLONIAL CHALLENGES (Shamil Jeppie, Ebrahim Moosa & Richard
Roberts eds., 2010).
9
Erik Owens, The Council on Foreign Relations Religion and Foreign Policy Series: Electoral and
Religious Conflict in Africa, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 1, 2010, 6:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erikowens/council-on-foreign-relati_b_790474.html (emphasis added).
10
JOHN CAMPBELL, NIGERIA: DANCING ON THE BRINK (2011).
11
Id. at 109, 138.
12
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, TOLERANCE AND TENSION: ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2010), available at http://pewforum.org/preface-islam-and-christianity-in-SubSaharan-africa.aspx [hereinafter TOLERANCE AND TENSION].
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the family and gender issues at the heart of the Sharia controversy. Finally, I
offer some concluding reflections on whether Muslim-Christian contestation in
Nigeria should be construed as a matter of religion qua religion or of “religion
by proxy,” on the prospects for moderate Sharia and juridical pluralism in
Nigeria, and on the importance of identity for understanding religious conflict
in Nigeria and elsewhere.
I. TOLERANCE AND TENSION AROUND RELIGION AND IDENTITY IN NIGERIA
First, the empirical data. The tenor of Muslim-Christian relations in Africa
has received increased attention in recent years—most notably in the Pew
Forum’s study, Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan
Africa.13 It is a study that sheds important light on the themes of religion,
family, democracy, pluralism, and human rights that are the subject of this
Symposium. The Tolerance and Tension study is wide-ranging, covering
nineteen countries and including numerous questions on religious affiliation,
level of religious commitment, the presence of traditional African beliefs and
practices, interreligious harmony and tension, and the relationship between
religion and society. In the Pew study, Nigeria is singled out early on for the
demographic division between its Muslim (52%) and Christian (46%)
population, the most even division among the countries included in the Pew
survey.14 In fact, analysis of the Pew data on Nigeria, in comparison with other
countries included in the study, shows that Nigeria is distinctive among subSaharan nations in a number of respects that bear significantly on questions of
religious identity and the potential for conflict. The distinctions are significant
for what they indicate about the sharpness of the Nigerian conflict, but there
are also places where the Nigerian responses are representative of larger trends
around religion, family, and identity that are increasingly seen worldwide.
A. Orthodoxy, Orthopraxy, and the “Clash of Monotheisms”
The statistics on Nigeria leave no doubt about the significance of religion
and the sharpness of religious conflict in parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
Participants at the CSLR’s Durban Consultation frequently referred to religious
conflict in Africa as involving a clash of orthodoxies and a competition of

13

Id.
Id. at 12. Nigeria also contains both the largest number of Muslims and the largest number of
Christians in sub-Saharan Africa. Id. at 19.
14

GREEN GALLEYSFINAL2

2011]

11/18/2011 9:17 AM

RELIGION, FAMILY LAW, AND RECOGNITION

949

monotheisms.15 The Pew data on religious affiliation and commitment suggest
some of the baseline reasons for the interreligious tensions in Nigeria. When it
comes to religious affiliation, 87% of Nigerian respondents said religion is
“very important in their lives.”16 It is a high response, but one which places
Nigeria merely in the median of the Pew survey countries in the highly
religious region.17 Nearly all Nigerians (97%) express religious beliefs in
heaven, hell, angels, and miracles; similarly high numbers, 87% of Christians
and 90% of Muslims, believe that the Bible or the Quran is the word of God
and should be interpreted literally.18 Large majorities of Nigerian Christians
(79%) and of Nigerian Muslims (86%) believe that their faith is the one true
faith leading to eternal life; somewhat lower, but still high, percentages of
Christians (66%) and of Muslims (70%) said there is only “ONE true way” to
interpret the teachings of their religions.19
The fervency of many Nigerians’ beliefs in literal scripture and theological
doctrines pertaining to heaven and similar concepts is combined with high
levels of religious commitment and practice. Both Muslims and Christians in
Nigeria reported similarly high levels of participation in a variety of religious
activities, including prayer, fasting, attendance at religious services, reading
religious materials, watching religious broadcasts, tithing or giving to charity,
praying or reading scripture with their children, and sending their children to
religious education programs.20 On many of these indices of religious
commitment, Nigeria is at or near the top of the Pew survey countries—even
more so for Christians than for Muslims. When it comes to intensity of practice
and commitment, Nigeria stands out among the Pew survey countries that are
majority Christian.21 Nigeria’s Christian community contains the highest
percentage of Pentecostal and the third-highest percentage of Charismatic
Christians; these traditions tend to be characterized by high levels of both
affiliation and commitment.22 Nearly twice as many Christians as Muslims in
Nigeria reported having witnessed or experienced divine healings, prophecy,
divine revelation, and exorcism—all phenomena that correlate with intense

15

See Foundations and Future of Law, supra note 6.
TOLERANCE AND TENSION, supra note 12, at 3.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 25–26, 175–76.
19 Id. at 193–94.
20 Id. at 3, 29, 218–19.
21 Id. at 20, 25–32.
22 Id. at 23, 156–57. Nigeria is tied with Ghana and Liberia at the top on the percentage of Christians who
are Pentecostal—26% in each country. Id.
16
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religiosity.23 The high levels of orthodoxy and orthopraxy among Nigerian
Muslims and Christians, along with the fervency of belief of some Christian
groups in the Pentecostal traditions, suggest that Nigerian religion is religion in
especially strong form.
Some commentators believe that the division between Muslims and
Christians in Nigeria is heightened by its comparatively low numbers of
adherents to African traditional religions, the practice of which can serve as a
buffer between the two monotheisms.24 Only 8% of the Nigerian respondents
reported adherence to indigenous religions, making it the second-lowest, above
only Rwanda, in levels of traditional religion.25 Where adherence to African
traditional religion persists in Nigeria, it is often syncretized into the dominant
Muslim and Christian religions. Nigerians, however, do believe in the
“prosperity gospel”—in fact, Nigeria is second only to neighboring Ghana in
the level of its Christian population (77%) that embraces the “prosperity
gospel”—and this can be a further source of religious division.26 The
“prosperity gospel” may, on the one hand, simply correlate with the overall
attitude of optimism that characterizes the Nigerian people. When asked
whether their lives were better than five years ago, 67% of Nigerians
responded affirmatively, second only to Chadians in their levels of optimism.27
On the other hand, in a highly religious country where the Muslim population
disproportionately experiences poverty and underdevelopment,28 the belief that
God grants health and wealth to the faithful could give rise to invidious
comparisons that might exacerbate interreligious tensions.
Another source of tension between Muslims and Christians in many parts
of Africa when it comes to religious affiliation and commitment is the practice

23

Id. at 211–14.
Ambassador John Campbell made this observation at a special session of the 2010 American Academy
of Religion at a panel, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, on the topic of “Religion and Foreign
Policy Conversation: Religious Conflict in Nigeria.” For more on this event, see M. Christian Green, Recent
Forum on Nigeria: Religion, Family, and the Weakened State, SHARIA, FAM. & DEMOCRACY NIGERIA &
BEYOND (Dec. 3, 2010), http://blogs.law.emory.edu/nigeriasharia/2010/12/03/recent-forum-on-nigeriareligion-family-and-the-weakened-state. At the same time, Campbell has also defended the significance of the
North-South, Muslim-Christian division in Nigeria. See John Campbell, Nigeria’s Challenge, ATLANTIC (June
24, 2011, 7:00 AM), www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/06/nigerias-challenge/240961.
25 TOLERANCE AND TENSION, supra note 12, at 34.
26 Id. at 31.
27 Id. at 16. Nigeria was tied with Ghana for third place, just behind Chad and Liberia, in the belief that
life would “be better in the future,” with 84% of respondents in each country saying that they expected that
their lives would be better in five years. Id. at 56. So the optimism is both retrospective and prospective.
28 See id. at 298–300.
24
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of proselytism and conversion, but the concern often seems to be based more
on perception than reality.29 Large majorities of Christians (93%) and Muslims
(88%) in Nigeria believe that members of their religions have a duty to try to
convert others to their religious faiths.30 While a significant percentage of
Christians (41%) describes itself as “evangelical,” the majority (56%) does not
claim evangelical status or the proselytizing motives that the name implies.31
When asked whether they share their faith or views on God with people of
other religions, 30% of Christians reported doing so at least once a week and
nearly as many (26%) reported sharing their faith once or twice a week—
indicating that a majority of Nigerian Christians regularly engages in activity
that could be construed as proselytism.32 Only 6% of Christians reported never
sharing their faith with non-Christians.33 By contrast, while 20% of Muslims
reported sharing their faith with non-Muslims on a weekly basis, the most
frequent response by Muslims was that they “seldom” shared their faith (25%),
and nearly as many reported that they “never” share their faith (20%)—
indicating that a near majority of Nigerian Muslims refrains from proselytizing
activities.34 Perhaps a more significant observation of these faith-sharing
tendencies is that, to the extent that such exchanges of religious views are
intended to proselytize and convert between Christianity and Islam, such
attempts have largely failed. In Nigeria, as in the vast majority of other
countries included in the Pew survey, zero percent of the surveyed population
reported switching between the two faiths.35

29 For an excellent recent discussion from a Muslim perspective, see A. Rashied Omar, The Right to
Religious Conversion: Between Apostasy and Proselytization (Kroc Inst., Occasional Paper No. 27:OP:1,
2006), available at http://ocw.nd.edu/peace-studies/islamic-ethics-of-war-and-peace/readings-1/omar-onreligious-conversion. See also SHARING THE BOOK: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF
PROSELYTISM (John Witte, Jr. & Richard C. Martin eds., 1999). For a well-argued critique of proselytism, see
Grace Kao, The Logic of Anti-Proselytization Revisited, in PROSELYTIZATION REVISITED: RIGHTS TALK, FREE
MARKETS AND CULTURE WARS 77–107 (Rosalind I.J. Hackett ed., 2008).
30 TOLERANCE AND TENSION, supra note 12, at 192.
31 Id. at 155.
32 Id. at 208.
33 Id.
34
Id.
35 Id. at 12. Though there is little religious switching between Christianity and Islam, there is switching
within Christianity. Responses to questions by Christians on the denomination in which they were raised and
the denomination to which they currently belong show net losses of 3% among Nigerian Catholics and net
gains of 4% among Nigerian Protestants. See id. at 24. It is possible that some of the anxiety about the
possibility of Muslim–Christian switching actually derives from these Christian concerns about
interdenominational switching, which has tended to favor the rising Pentecostal movement, whose fervency
and evangelism may be perceived as a threat by Muslims as well.
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B. Freedom, Democracy, and Trust in the “Unknown Other”
Concerns about religious competition and conflict are also reflected in the
sections of the Pew study dealing with interreligious relations and views on
religious freedom and democracy. Some significant insights into the nature and
quality of interreligious relations in Nigeria come in the responses to a series of
questions on moral characteristics associated with the two religions. When
asked for perceptions of Muslims, both Christians and Muslims maintained
that Muslims are honest and devout; but Christians were somewhat more likely
to find Muslims to be selfish and immoral, significantly more likely to find
Muslims to be arrogant and violent, and significantly less likely to find
Muslims to be tolerant and respectful of women.36 When asked for
characteristics associated with Christians, both Christians and Muslims found
Christians to be overwhelmingly honest and nonviolent.37 Muslims are
somewhat more likely to say that Christians are selfish, immoral, and arrogant;
significantly less likely to find Christians to be devout; and significantly more
likely to say Christians are intolerant and do not respect women.38 The
significant gap in the perception of each group’s treatment of women is
especially important for questions of Sharia and family law.
These perceptual differences become even clearer in the Pew data on
perceptions of religious extremism and interreligious hostility. On the
questions of religious extremism, half of both Muslims and Christians reported
being “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” about extremist groups in
the country.39 This high level of concern about extremism might be a source of
conflict between the religions. But one of the more surprising findings of the
Pew study on this point was that the largest percentages of both Christians
(21%) and Muslims (26%) were most concerned about members of their own
religion.40 Another key finding is that Christians are more concerned about

36 Id. at 113–20. Nigerians, both Christians and Muslims, are less likely to deem members of the other
religion to be “violent” than other Pew survey countries. While the discrepancy between Christians and
Muslim views of each other suggests a high level of in-country tension, the 25% gap between Christians and
Muslims on the question is near the median for the countries surveyed. Much higher discrepancies are found,
for example, in neighboring Ghana where the gap is 50%. See id. at 8.
37 The finding that Muslims do not associate Christians with violence is striking and worthy of further
research, as it would appear that much of the intercommunal violence in Nigeria is bilateral, reciprocal, and
retaliatory.
38 Id. at 121–28. This is an area of the survey where there are significant percentages of “don’t know”
and “refused to respond” answers.
39 Id. at 277.
40 Id. at 278.
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Muslims than Muslims are about Christians.41 The largest percentage of
Muslims (38%) said that very few Muslims in Nigeria support extremist
groups like al Qaeda, but the Christian response was more mixed, with the
largest percentages saying “just some” (24%) or “very few” (23%) Muslims
support extremists, but with a sizable percentage (17%) saying “many”
Muslims support extremists and the largest group (28%) saying they did not
know or refusing to respond.42
On the subject of interreligious hostility, Nigerian Muslims were charitable
toward their Christian neighbors on measures of perceived harmony or
hostility, with the largest percentage (39%) saying “very few” Christians are
hostile toward Muslims in their country.43 The gap between the two groups is
not pronounced on this point, as 31% of Christians had the same view, but a
nearly equal 27% of Christians did admit some Christian hostility toward
Muslims. Muslims were even more insistent on disclaiming animosity toward
Christians, with 44% expressing the view that “very few” Muslims have such
hostility.44 Once again, Christians were more divided, with 25% saying “very
few” and 29% saying “just some” Muslims are hostile toward Christians.
Muslims and Christians were also divided over the question of the
government’s treatment of religious groups.45 The largest group of Muslims
(33%) said that members of their religion are “not too often” treated unfairly
and nearly the same percentage (34%) said that Christians, too, do “not often”

41 Id. In a more recent Pew Global Attitudes Project survey comparing Muslim and Western perceptions,
this statistic is reversed, with more Muslims expressing unfavorable opinions than vice versa. See PEW
GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, MUSLIM-WESTERN TENSIONS PERSIST: COMMON CONCERNS ABOUT ISLAMIC
EXTREMISM (2011), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2066/muslims-westerners-christians-jewsislamic-extremism-september-11.
42 TOLERANCE AND TENSION, supra note 12, at 280. The Muslim percentage of those who responded
“don’t know” or refused to respond is also high at 34%. Id. Indeed, the responses on religious extremism were
high across all of the African countries surveyed, approaching or exceeding 50% of the total population in
Liberia (49%) and Zambia (51%), with additional high don’t know/refuse to respond scores in both stable
countries, such as Botswana (48%), and in post-conflict and post-apartheid societies, such as Rwanda (46%)
and South Africa (58%). Id. It would be worth inquiring whether there is some dynamic in post-conflict
societies that leads to reticence to respond on the question of religious extremism, as well as what the refusal
to respond might mean in more stable societies.
43 Id. at 281. It is worth noting that on all questions in this portion of the survey covering intergroup
hostility and preferential treatment by the government, substantial percentages of both Christians and
Muslims—often nearly 20% in each group—gave “don’t know” or “refuse to answer” responses. This
reticence may itself be an indication of the sensitivity of the topic.
44 Id. at 282. The Pew researchers reported a margin of error of plus or minus 4% for results on the total
population and of 6% for Christians and 5% for Muslims in Nigeria. Id. at 66.
45 Id.

GREEN GALLEYSFINAL2

954

11/18/2011 9:17 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

suffer unfair treatment.46 The resentment in this area seems to be more on the
part of Christians, 35% of whom said Muslims “never” suffer unfair treatment
and who were twice as likely as Muslims to report that Christians suffer unfair
treatment “very often” or “somewhat often.”47
The existence of Muslim-Christian tensions could be interpreted as a
potential threat to religious freedom, and perhaps even to democracy, to the
extent that it reflects unequal privileging of one group over another. And yet
religious tension coexists with strong perception of and support for democracy
and religious freedom in Nigeria and many of the other Pew survey countries.
On the one hand, 71% of Christians and 68% of Muslims in Nigeria said
democracy is preferable to other forms of government.48 On the other hand,
74% of Christians and 80% of Muslims agreed with the statement, “People like
me don’t have any say about what the government does,” suggesting a rather
low sense of participation.49 Despite their suspicion toward people of other
religions, 66% of Christians and 68% of Muslims said religious leaders should
express their views on political questions, and similarly high percentages of
Christians (63%) and Muslims (59%) said it is acceptable for religious leaders
to have different religious views from their own.50
The tolerance for religion in the public square may be a function of the
widespread perception of religious freedom, as reflected in the responses that
74% of Christians and 79% of Muslims feel “very free” to practice their
religions in their country and 67% of Christians and 74% of Muslims feel that
people from religions different from theirs are free to practice their religion
and that this a “good thing.”51 But this perception of religious freedom does

46

Id. at 283–84.
Id.
48 Id. at 84. Nigeria is fifth from the bottom of the Pew survey countries on this measure, but the high
percentage suggests a strong perception of religious freedom in Nigeria.
49 Id. at 87.
50 Id. at 91, 94. Nigerian responses to these two questions were not extreme in comparison to the other
Pew study countries and tended to cluster in the middle tier around the median. See id. at 52.
51 Id. at 96, 98. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief has, however, made a
different determination. A country report on Nigeria from 2005 maintains:
47

The level of insecurity in certain areas of Nigeria can also be attributed to religious reasons,
which makes the right to freedom of religion even more vulnerable. Nigerians can legitimately
claim that they do not feel secure to freely practise their religion because they may feel targeted
because of their religious identity.
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Mission to Nigeria, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 45,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/5./Add.2 (Oct. 7, 2005) (by Asma Jahangir) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur].
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seem to overlay a base level of interreligious competition, misunderstanding,
and distrust. Among Christians, 82% feel that Christians are increasing their
influence on life in the country and that this is a good thing, and 73% of
Muslims think that Muslims are increasing their influence and that this is a
good thing.52 Each group, however, is far less sanguine about the other group
expanding its influence. Only 37% of Christians think that Muslims are
expanding their influence and that this is a good thing, and only 42% of
Muslims think that Christians are increasing their influence and that this is a
good thing.53
When it comes to actual knowledge of each other’s faith, the largest
percentages of both Christians (34%) and Muslims (42%) claim to know “not
very much” and 21% of both groups claim to know “nothing at all” about the
other religion.54 When it comes to interreligious cooperation, 60% of
Christians and 65% of Muslims say their mosque, church, or house of worship
does not work together with institutions of the other religion to find solutions
to community problems.55 These are not happy statistics when it comes to the
potential for religious cooperation transcending religious conflict, but they do
indicate a space in which greater knowledge of religious “others” could have a
beneficial effect. For rather than a “narcissism of minor differences” based on
substantial knowledge of the religious “other,” Muslim-Christian
misunderstanding in Nigeria seems more likely to be based on an “other” who
is, to a significant degree, unknown. This lack of knowledge of and common
experience with the other religion does not, however, prevent members of both
religions from forming perceptions about the nature and extent of their
religious similarities and differences. Here, both groups are divided, with 48%
of Muslims and 42% of Christians saying the two religions have “a lot in
common” and 45% of Muslims and 53% of Christians considering them to be
“very different.”56 Thus, in perceptions of religious difference, as well as
perceptions of religious freedom, Christians were inclined, if only slightly, to
be more wary of Muslims than vice versa.

52 TOLERANCE AND TENSION, supra note 12, at 105, 108. As with the questions on intergroup hostility
and preferential treatment, there are significant numbers of “don’t know” and “refuse to respond” answers to
these questions, perhaps indicative of another area of sensitivity alongside perceptions of religious extremism.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 100–01.
55 Id. at 165.
56 Id. at 103.
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Perhaps most significant for intergroup relations, and a further challenge to
Nigerians’ rosy perceptions of religious freedom and democracy in their
country, are statistics showing Muslims and Christians to be quite divided over
basic levels of social trust toward members of other religions. In response to a
question about their level of trust of people of other religions, 48% of
Christians and 43% of Muslims reported that they trust people who have
different religious values, but nearly identical percentages (43% of Christians
and 47% of Muslims) said that they do not trust people of the other faith.57
These divisions over the possibility of interreligious trust may simply be
reflections of an overall low level of trust in Nigerian society. The section of
the Pew survey on interreligious tensions does, after all, begin with the statistic
that 62% of Nigerian Christians and 59% of Nigerian Muslims said “you can’t
be too careful in dealing with people,” as opposed to “most people can be
trusted” in their society.58 In that sense, the somewhat lower levels of distrust
of believers of the other faith may be an improvement on the more general
level of distrust. But these mixed statistics on trust in Nigeria coexist with
grimmer statistics on perceptions of religious conflict. When asked about a
range of social and political problems in their country—including crime,
political corruption, ethnic conflict, and unemployment, all of which tended to
be widely cited across the board in the sub-Saharan nations represented in the
Pew study—Nigerians were second only to post-genocide Rwandans in seeing
religious conflict as a “very big problem.”59
The Pew indices on religious freedom, democracy, and interreligious
tensions, along with the data on religious affiliation and practice, are
significant for what they reveal about the perceptions and the sense of group
identity of Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. They reflect the state of
Nigeria’s national character and identity in relation to its sub-Saharan African
peers.
II. RELIGION, FAMILY, AND THE RECOGNITION OF IDENTITY
In addition to bringing to light a variety of issues related to religious
affiliation and commitment, interreligious relations, and the relationship of
religion, democracy, and society, the Pew Tolerance and Tension study also
57

Id. at 130.
Id. at 83. Nigeria appears to be a low-trust society, but it is merely in the median of the Pew countries.
Tanzania, Cameroon, and Senegal have the highest levels of distrust, with 83%, 82%, and 74%, respectively,
of Muslims and Christians combined reporting distrust of others.
59 Id. at 9.
58
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raises a number of points concerning law, religion, family, and identity.
Several results among the Pew statistics on religion, politics, and society have
a direct bearing on the Sharia controversy and the question of juridical
pluralism. Most significantly, the Pew data indicate that the tendencies of both
Christians and Muslims toward literal faith and orthodox belief may carry over
from the religious to the legal sector. Among Christians, 70% favor making the
Bible the official law of the land, and 75% of Muslims favor the
implementation of Sharia.60 Both the Christian and Muslim scores on support
for religiously based law are very high, comparatively speaking, coming in
second and third, respectively, among the Pew survey countries.61 In particular,
large percentages of both Christians and Muslims in the Pew data on Nigeria,
60% and 71%, respectively, favor allowing religious beliefs to decide family
and property disputes.62 Christians reject harsh punishments based on religious
law by percentages of nearly 90% across the board, but significant majorities
of Muslims also disapprove of such Sharia-based punishments as whipping and
cutting off hands for crimes of theft and robbery (54%), stoning for people
who commit adultery (60%), and the death penalty for “apostates” who leave
the Muslim religion (65%).63 This sort of moderation on such matters as harsh
religious punishments lends credence to the recent speculation that a more
moderate form of Sharia may be emerging in Nigeria.
When it comes to family matters, specifically the selection of marriage
partners, Christians and Muslims in most of the countries in the Pew study
show a very strong tendency toward religious endogamy, with all but four
countries reporting intra-religious marriage rates of 90% or above for both
Christian and Muslim populations. In the Pew study, Nigeria is tied with Mali
behind Senegal for second place in rates of religious endogamy, with 97% of
Nigerian Christians and 98% of Nigerian Muslims married or living with a
partner of the same religion.64 Of course, Mali and Senegal are
overwhelmingly Muslim countries—so much so that the Pew study does not
include statistics on intra-religious marriage rates for the small number of non60

Id. at 11, 285, 289.
When responses to several questions about religious law, religious judges, and religious punishments
were aggregated in the Pew study under the general heading of support for “religious jurisprudence,” Nigeria
appeared more moderate than the responses on Biblical/Sharia law suggest. In this aggregate measure, 41% of
Muslims and a mere 8% of Christians reported high levels of support for “religious jurisprudence” in this
broader sense. See id. at 51. It could be that the zeal reflected in the opening questions about religious law
dissipated in connection with subsequent questions about harsh punishments.
62 Id. at 286, 290.
63 Id. at 291–93.
64 Id. at 260.
61
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Muslims living in those countries. That Nigeria has such a high rate of intrareligious marriage, even with its overall religious diversity, suggests a high
degree of identity investment in forming families within the faith—and
possibly of a high degree of religious community segregation between the
Muslim and Christian populations of the various Nigerian federal states. That
some observers have noted a correlation between Muslim-Christian
intermarriage and more harmonious relations where the groups are intermixed
may be the happy exception to the general trend toward intra-religious
marriage and the potential for interreligious hostility that may accompany this
in-group preference.65
This concern for marriage and community identity is also found in the
responses to questions about the possibility of religious exogamy of offspring.
Asked whether they would be comfortable with a child of theirs marrying a
person of the other faith, 50% of Nigerian Muslims and 42% of Nigerian
Christians said that they would be “not at all comfortable” and an additional
16% of Muslims and 24% of Christians would be “not too comfortable.”66
Interestingly, despite the concerns about interreligious marriage in the family,
29% of Nigerian Muslims and 30% of Nigerian Christians have immediate
family members who are of the other faith.67 The concerns about interreligious
marriage may correlate to concerns about religious conversion because
intermarriage is often the occasion and motivation for religious conversion, but
the strength of response on the religious exogamy question alone is worthy of
note.
On issues of marital morality, Nigeria is generally conservative along with
many other African countries. That 79% of Nigerian Christians see divorce as
morally wrong is, thus, consistent with the wider regional view.68 The 41% of
65

John Campbell, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the
American Academy of Religion on “Religion and Foreign Policy Conservation: Religious Conflict in Nigeria”
(Oct. 30, 2010).
66 TOLERANCE AND TENSION, supra note 12, at 166–67. It is worth considering whether the concerns
about interreligious marriage correlated to concerns about religious conversion in any way, because
intermarriage could be the occasion and motivation for religious conversion.
67 Id. at 264–65. The Nigerian statistics on interreligious families are close to the median on these
measures. They do not, for example, approach the much higher rates of familial interreligiosity in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), Mozambique, and Uganda. The rates of Muslims having Christian
family members in those countries are as follows: DRC: 62%; Mozambique: 93%; Uganda: 66%. The rates of
Christians having Muslim family members are lower across the board for most countries, but the percentages
for Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda still exceed or match Nigeria, according to the following breakdown:
Mozambique: 43%; Rwanda: 30%; Uganda: 32%.
68 Id. at 268.
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Nigerian Muslims who see divorce as morally wrong, however, comprise a low
percentage compared not only to Christians in-country, but also to Muslims in
other surveyed countries, who disapprove of divorce to a greater extent than
their Nigerian counterparts.69 This apparent tolerance of divorce among
Nigerian Muslims, in light of the disadvantages that often flow to women and
children from marital dissolution, makes the Sharia law of divorce a
particularly important topic for consideration of both interreligious relations
and women’s equality. One of the other key findings of the Pew survey,
despite the generally conservative approach of both Christians and Muslims
throughout the African subcontinent on issues of morality, is a profound
disagreement over polygamy, with Muslims being significantly more likely
than Christians to approve of polygamous relationships.70 The overwhelming
percentage of Nigerian Muslims (63%) approving of polygamy and even
higher percentage of Christians (76%) deeming it morally wrong are, thus, not
unexpected.71 In fact, Nigeria has the highest rate of Muslim polygamy among
the countries in the Pew study, with 40% of Muslim men reporting that they
have more than one wife.72 It is, however, noteworthy that the discrepancy
between Nigerian Christians and Muslims on the permissibility of polygamy
(53%) is the second highest among the Pew survey countries, followed by
Ethiopia (49%) and Tanzania (46%).73 Ethiopia and Tanzania are majorityChristian countries, but each is also one-third Muslim and has seen some
escalation in Muslim–Christian tensions in recent years, including disputes
around Sharia law.74 For these reasons, pronounced discrepancies between
69

Id.
Id. at 16, 53.
71 Id. at 274.
72 Id. at 318. Interestingly, Nigerian Christian men reported being in polygamous relationships at a rate of
14%—not the highest rate in the study, as 31% of Ugandan Christian men reported being in polygamous
relationships—but this does illustrate a significant rate of departure from Christian doctrinal norms among
Nigerian Christians. It would be worth knowing whether Nigerian polygamy among Christians tends to occur
where Christians live in close contact with Muslims or practitioners of indigenous religious or cultural norms,
both of which could influence Christians in the direction of polygamy.
73 Ghana’s discrepancy of 63% is the highest, with 78% of Christians and 15% of Muslims saying the
polygamy is “morally wrong.” See id. at 274.
74 See, e.g., Ethiopia: Muslim Radicals Burn Twelve Protestant Churches. One Dead, Dozens Injured,
SPERO NEWS (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.speroforum.com/a/50143/Ethiopia---Ethiopia-Muslim-radicalsburn-twelve-Protestant-churches-One-dead-dozens-injured; Aaron Maasho, Ethiopia: PM Blames Muslim Sect
over Church Attacks, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2011, 1:11 PM), http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/
idAFJOE72C05220110313; Alawi Masare, Faith Bigotry Was One Huge Worry in 2010, CITIZEN (Dar es
Salaam) (Dec. 30, 2010, 9:57 AM), http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/5-political-news/6770-faith-bigotry-wasone-huge-worry-in-2010.html; Saumu Mwalimu, New Cabinet Urged to Push Setting up of Kadhi Court,
CITIZEN (Dar es Salaam) (Nov. 25, 2010, 7:46 AM), http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/4-national-news/5834new-cabinet-urged-to-push-setting-up-of-kadhi-court.html.
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Muslims and Christians over issues like polygamy could reflect or even be
indicia of larger intergroup tensions grounded in religion, family, and identity.
Another index of interreligious relations, often cited as a barometer of more
general social advancement, is the status of women. Here, too, the Pew study
offers some interesting results. On the question of whether only men should be
allowed to serve in religious roles, 42% of Nigerian Christians and 67% of
Nigerian Muslims would impose such restrictions.75 What is somewhat notable
about Nigeria on this point is the division among Christians. Against the trend
in a number of the Pew survey countries toward permitting women to be
religious leaders, the 49% of Nigerians who approve of women’s leadership
are nearly offset by the 42% who are opposed.76 This gender conservatism
among Nigerian Christians may arise from their interpretation of their religious
tradition, but it could also reflect a concession to surrounding norms that
include the more conservative Muslim views. When it comes to some
measures of gender norms and the status of women, Nigerian Muslims do tend
toward conservatism. In response to the Pew study question of whether women
should have the right to decide to wear a veil or should defer to their
surrounding community, 64% of Nigerian Muslims said women should not
have the right to decide, but rather should wear the veil if dictated by their
surrounding communities.77 Nigeria is tied with Cameroon at the top of the
Pew study countries in denying women choice in veiling.
The gender norms regarding women’s roles and women’s rights reflected in
the Pew data on women’s religious leadership and the question of the veil are
just two specific measures, but they are suggestive of broader themes that
should be taken into account when assessing the relationship between religion,
family, and identity. It is in this light that Ambassador John Campbell’s
remarks on the “internal migration” to the family, ethnicity, and religion are a
potential threat when it comes to the status of women. Participants in the
CSLR’s Durban Consultation on “Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Africa”
discussed whether religious human rights were “luxury” rights in their focus on
civil and political equality, when matters of economic and social equality often
seem to be more pressing on the African continent.78 The overwhelming
consensus was that religion was by no means a component of a rights

75
76
77
78

TOLERANCE AND TENSION, supra note 12, at 195.
Id.
Id. at 196.
See Foundations and Future of Law, supra note 6.
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superstructure that is dispensable, or derogable, in times of turmoil, but rather
that religion assumes even greater importance as a source of economic, social,
and spiritual coping—as well as a strong source of community identity.79 In the
same way that religious freedom should not be discounted as a human right,
women’s human rights should not be sidelined in the quest for religious
freedom as a human right.
The question of Sharia in family law, political democracy, and religious
pluralism in Nigeria is certainly a question of religious human rights—for
Muslims, Christians, and practitioners of other faiths. The concern of Muslims
for juridical freedom in implementing Sharia must be balanced against the
freedom of Christians to be exempt from Sharia in Muslim-majority areas.80 In
the realm of family law, the Sharia debate involves powerful forces around
religion, gender, and the prospects for peace in Nigeria’s ongoing
interreligious conflict. Discrimination against women has often occurred in the
institutions of religion and family, which is why religion and family—and
women’s lives, embodiment, and inculturation—are such frequent
battlegrounds in struggles for community identity.81 Recent developments in
the global economic recession, including the loss of traditionally masculine
industrial jobs to globalization and burgeoning populations of young people—
particularly young men—in the developing world, are increasingly calling into
question existing gender and family arrangements.82 This past winter, a slap in
the face to a young male fruit seller in Tunisia by a female police officer—
experienced by the young man as a humiliating reversal of cultural gender
norms and an affront both to him and to the family he was helping to support—

79
80

Id.

For a discussion of the threat that Sharia poses to Christians, see JUDE OSELOKA EZEANOKWASA, THE
LEGAL INEQUALITY OF MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN MARRIAGES IN NIGERIA (2011). See also Jude O.
Ezeanokwasa, Sharia, Secular State and Nigeria: A Matter of Getting down to the Basics, SHARIA, FAM. &
DEMOCRACY NIGERIA & BEYOND (Apr. 20, 2011), http://blogs.law.emory.edu/nigeriasharia/2011/04/20/shariasecular-state-and-nigeria-a-matter-of-getting-down-to-the-basics/.
81 For an excellent discussion of the challenges—and sometimes threats—that religion may pose to
women’s rights, see Madhayi Sunder, Keeping Faith: Reconciling Women’s Human Rights and Religion, in
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green eds., 2011). See also
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Study on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Status of
Women in Light of Religion and Traditions, Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/73/Add.2
(Apr. 24, 2009) (by Abdelfattah Amor).
82 See Hanna Rosin, The End of Men, ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2010, at 56; Reihan Salam, The Death of
Macho, FOREIGN POL’Y, July/Aug. 2009, at 65.
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touched off a series of revolutions in North Africa and the Islamic world.83 The
revolutions in Egypt and Libya incorporated both gender-based sexual crimes
against women and calls for women’s human rights to be recognized to a
greater extent in the reconstituted societies, but there were also calls by
conservative Muslim groups for the robust implementation of Sharia.84 There
also was a sense that Muslims in Nigeria and other parts of the global Islamic
community were watching these developments and feeling them with special
force.85 Questions of religion, gender, family, and identity are all at the heart of
the Sharia debate in Nigeria, and they will be significantly affected by how that
debate is ultimately resolved.
CONCLUDING POINTS: RELIGION BY PROXY, THE PROSPECTS FOR MODERATE
SHARIA, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTITY
There are two arguments that one regularly encounters in considering
interreligious conflict in Nigeria. The first argument has to do with the
phenomenon of “religion by proxy,” which is said to be a prominent feature of
religious conflict in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa. The argument is that
religion is an ascribed rationale for conflicts that are really social, economic,
and political in nature. In some cases, the “religion by proxy” description is an
accurate reflection of the complexity of the situation. There is also a tendency
among some social and political scientists, long influenced by the
“secularization” thesis, to view religion as less salient than other factors. This
view is sometimes aided and abetted by certain religion scholars who
“sacralize” religion and religious studies by viewing religion as supernatural,
transcendent, and ultimate, so as to avoid subjecting the matters of the spirit to
the aims and evaluations of the social sciences out of a fear of co-optation or
corruption. The conflict over Sharia in Nigeria is a prime example of the need
to inquire broadly into the situation in Nigeria and other African nations and to
probe the more porous boundaries between religion and politics that exist there

83 Roger Cohen, Commentary, Facebook and Arab Dignity, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 25, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/opinion/25iht-edcohen25.html; Karim Fahim, Slap to a Man’s Pride Set
off Tumult in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, at A1.
84 See Isobel Coleman, Commentary, Is Revolution Bad for Women’s Rights?, WASH. POST, Feb. 20,
2011, at B3.
85 See John Campbell, Commentary, Nigeria: The Morning After, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 3, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/opinion/03iht-edcampbell03.html; Edegbe Odemwingle, Commentary,
North Africa: The Jasmine Revolution and the Nigerian Nightmare, LEADERSHIP (Abuja), Feb. 20, 2011,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201102210983.html; Peter Run, Commentary, Is Nigeria Doomed to Follow
Sudan’s Example?, ABC.NET (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/97708.html.
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more so than in the United States and other countries with traditions of
religion–state separation.
For example, the recent annual reports of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom (“USCIRF”)—which in recent years has
designated Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” on issues of religious
freedom86—strive rigorously, and correctly, to balance religion among the
various social, political, and economic factors afoot in Nigeria. The USCIRF
Nigeria reports on chronic “incidents of violent communal conflict across
religious and ethnic lines, which are often intertwined.”87 The commissioners
note that religion is “often used by politicians as a proxy for political or
economic disputes within northern communities.”88 In particular, the
commissioners observe that “[r]eligion and religious identity are intertwined
in ethnic, political, economic and social controversies, and can be misused by
politicians, religious leaders, or others to rouse their constituencies for political
gain,” so that, while “religion is a significant catalyst in the violence, the
violence is not purely religious in nature.”89 The U.S. State Department’s 2010
International Religious Freedom Report for Nigeria cites a number of specific
factors that continue to feed the conflict, particularly in the country’s Middle
Belt region, including controversies over “indigene/settler laws, discriminatory
employment practices, and resource competition.”90 The U.S. State
Department analysts have further observed:
Religious differences often paralleled and exacerbated differences
among ethnic group[s]. In the Middle Belt, identity is simultaneously
molded along both ethnic and religious lines. Competition for scarce
resources, in concert with livelihood differences and discriminatory
employment practices, often underlay the violence. Local politicians
and others continued to use religion on occasion to spur hostility
91
among groups.

86 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 57–64 (2009) [hereinafter 2009
ANNUAL REPORT]; U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 98–109 (2011) [hereinafter
2011 ANNUAL REPORT].
87 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 241 (2008) (emphasis added).
88 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 58 (emphasis added).
89 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 98 (emphasis added).
90 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Country Report for
Nigeria, in INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2010 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/irf/2010/148713.htm.
91 Id.
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The former UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma
Jahangir, has also pointed out the multifactoral nature of the hostilities, with
particular attention to the implications for religious freedom. In this regard, she
has observed that “while economic, political, and other factors contribute to
such tensions, they have often led to polarization along religious lines.”92
The confluence of religion with these other economic, social, and political
factors in the Nigerian situation has implications not only for religious
freedom, but also for religious identity. In this regard, Special Rapporteur
Jahangir has observed:
The level of insecurity in certain areas of Nigeria can also be
attributed to religious reasons, which makes the right to freedom of
religion even more vulnerable. Nigerians can legitimately claim that
they do not feel secure to freely practise their religion because they
93
may feel targeted because of their religious identity.

While the notion of “religion by proxy” is certainly applicable in the cases of
Nigeria and other African nations where religion is intertwined with
economics, politics, and social status, it is this crucial connection to identity
that is at risk of being overlooked or minimized in considering religion as
merely a proxy for other concerns. Leading social scientists have recently
argued that religion is more and more a matter of choice than a status or
community into which one is born with few avenues for escape.94 It is perhaps
this sense, along with the resurgence of religion and the increased contact
among religions in our globalized world, that is fueling concerns of
proselytization and conversion—even, as we have seen, where the statistics do
not bear out the reality of religious switching—becoming reality. But the
novelty of this sort of freedom of choice in matters of religion should not count
against the seriousness of those choices for those who make them. It may be
the case that the increased number of options when it comes to religious
choice, rather than simply auguring the death of traditional religious identity,
may be giving rise to new forms of religious identity—reaffirming the overall
importance of religious identity in the process. Thus, while the Sharia debate in
Nigeria is a crucial forum for the negotiation of matters of religious freedom

92

Special Rapporteur, supra note 51, at 2 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 45 (emphasis added).
94 See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 7, at 23; PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE,
FAITH IN FLUX: CHANGES IN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION IN THE U.S. (2009). Micklethwait and Wooldridge argue
that, given the tendency to imitate U.S. culture that is found in many parts of the world, the trends that Pew
reports in the United States are likely global. See also CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 3 (2007).
93
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and human rights for Muslims and Christians seeking to coexist peacefully in
Nigeria’s federal and religiously plural system, it is equally a forum in which
Muslims and Christians are seeking to defend religious choice and religious
identity in the context of a modern, pluralistic democracy.
These observations on democracy, pluralism, and identity turn out to be
important, as well, in assessing a second argument that has surfaced in
discussions of religious conflict in Nigeria. This argument concerns the
prospects of the emergence in Nigeria of a moderate Sharia, though it may
seem unlikely in connection with a country that has recently given rise to the
Boko Haram (“Western education is sacrilege”) movement and to Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab, the fortuitously inept Detroit airplane underwear
bomber of 2009. Indeed, analysis of the Abdulmutallab case and the inchoate
but emerging Islamist movements in Nigeria in the last few years has indicated
that Nigeria resembles some of its recently revolutionary North African
neighbors in the presence in the less developed northern states of restive young
Muslim men (and equally disaffected Christian men) who perpetrate much of
the intercommunal violence.95 It is this demographic that seems most
susceptible to traditionalist, or even extremist, Islamic movements, that might
hold out strict interpretations of Sharia that would lead to a continuation of
conflict.
Even so, New York Times Africa correspondent Lydia Polgreen has
observed that the “Islamic revolution that seemed so destined to transform
northern Nigeria in recent years appears to have come and gone—or at least
gone in a direction few here would have expected.”96 Indeed, she maintains
that “the practice of Islamic law, or Shariah, which had gone on for centuries
in the private sphere before becoming enshrined in public law, has settled into
a distinctively Nigerian compromise between the dictates of faith and the
chaotic realities of modern life in an impoverished, developing nation.”97 As
other contributors to this Symposium have noted in their case studies of the
implementation of Sharia in various Nigerian states, these sorts of
compromises can be the hallmark of a robust federal system that allows such

95 The gap between expectation, reality, and the prospects for the future is apparently ensnaring even the
affluent in these societies, for Abdulmutallab himself hailed from a wealthy Muslim family. See Adam
Nossiter, Lonely Trek to Radicalism for Terror Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at A1, A10.
96 Lydia Polgreen, Nigeria Turns from Harsher Side of Islamic Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2007, at A1.
97 Id. at A1, B4; see also M. Christian Green, Moderate Sharia in the Secular State?, SHARIA, FAM. &
DEMOCRACY NIGERIA & BEYOND (Nov. 5, 2010), http://blogs.law.emory.edu/nigeriasharia/2010/11/05/
moderate-sharia-in-the-secular-state (emphasis added).
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local accommodations to flourish. Nigeria’s federal structure could serve as the
sort of “laboratory of democracy” envisioned by many federalist theorists. In
this case, the very publicity of Sharia implementation in the context of a
democracy might invite public scrutiny in a way that leads toward modification
in the direction of greater moderation.
Of course, the grimmer alternative that haunts many Nigerian observers is
the possibility that the country might ultimately go the way of Sudan and
partition into two separate states, or the way of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya and
enter into an uncertain revolution. Whether Nigeria opts for tradition,
moderation, or revolution will have an inevitable effect on its national identity
as a modern, pluralistic democracy—not to mention the religious and political
identity of its Muslim and Christian populations—in what some are describing
as an “age of identity” in our modern, global situation.98 This Essay has
explored these concerns over identity as revealed in the social science data on
tolerance and tensions surrounding religion, freedom, democracy, and family
in Nigeria. It has supported the need for multivalent and interdisciplinary
inquiry into these matters, so as to avoid unnecessary reductionism and
marginalization of religion in the “religion by proxy” argument. It has pointed
to the new discussions about the possibilities of a moderate Sharia emerging in
Nigeria in a way that could give Nigerian Sharia its own distinctive identity in
the Muslim world and Islamic jurisprudence. But the path ahead for Nigerian
Sharia—and Nigeria itself—is uncertain. Meanwhile, it seems inevitable that
rights and identity will coalesce, and occasionally conflict, in their mutual
demand for recognition. Above all, as this Symposium has suggested, law and
religion will continue to be crucial areas for the construction of identity—other
sources of normativity and power—in modern, pluralistic democracies
worldwide.
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